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PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM 
Angarika Deb1, Daniel Smith2 
1. Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. 
2. Bristol Medical School: Population Health Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK.  
 
Synonyms: Evolution of altruistic cooperation; Evolutionary altruism; Psychological altruism.  
 
Definition: We define two ‘problems of altruism’. The first is the classic problem of altruism, 
defined as the issue of how a behavior which decreases an individual’s lifetime reproductive 
success, while helping another individual (or individuals) increase their lifetime reproductive 
success, can evolve. We also define a ‘second-order problem of altruism’, where different 
authors have different conceptions of what does, and does not, constitute ‘altruism’, including 




Why would an organism help others at a cost to themselves, without any future reward or 
pay-off? This, in essence, is the problem of altruism. Despite notions of ‘survival of the 
fittest’ and ‘nature, red in tooth and claw’, seemingly-altruistic acts abound in the natural 
world: meerkat sentinels famously forego feeding opportunities to guard the troop from 
predators; many species of mammals, birds and fish engage in ‘cooperative breeding’, where 
subordinates sacrifice their own reproduction to help others breed; and humans regularly help 
others with no apparent benefit to themselves (e.g., giving blood, donating to charity, 
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engaging in warfare). This altruistic behavior reaches its zenith in eusocial insects, where 
huge swathes of the colony surrender reproduction altogether to help raise the offspring of a 
single queen (or handful of queens). Individual somatic cells within a body can also be 
thought of as altruistic, as only the germ-line (sperm and eggs) is passed on to the next 
generation: all other somatic cells in the body therefore work altruistically in service of the 
germ-line.  
In all these cases it would not appear to be in an individual’s interest to engage in such 
sacrificial behavior: for instance, a worker bee is not able to pass her genes down to future 
generations as they are unable to sire offspring of their own. Natural selection is generally 
believed to maximize individual fitness, yet the existence - and almost ubiquity - of altruism 
in nature clearly flouts this general rule, and requires special explanation. Darwin appeared 
acutely aware of this issue, particularly regarding eusocial insects, and in On the Origin of 
Species (1859 pg. 236) wrote: 
“I…will confine myself to one special difficulty, which at first appeared to me 
insuperable, and actually fatal to my whole theory. I allude to the neuters or sterile 
females in insect communities: for these neuters often differ widely in instinct and in 
structure from both the male and fertile females, and yet, from being sterile, they 
cannot propagate their kind.” 
Over the next 100 years a solution to this conundrum of how such altruistic behavior can 
evolve was touched upon by some (including Sewall Wright, Ronald Fisher and JBS 
Haldane), but was not comprehensively addressed until William Hamilton in the early 1960s 
published his concept of ‘inclusive fitness’ (Hamilton, 1964). Rather than taking an 
organism’s individual fitness in terms of personal reproductive success, inclusive fitness 
partitions fitness into the effect of the focal individual’s actions on their own fitness (so-
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called direct fitness) and the effect of the focal individual’s actions on others’ fitness (so-
called indirect fitness), which is weighted by the coefficient of relatedness (r) between the 
individuals. r is the probability that individuals share altruistic genes, above baseline levels of 
the gene(s) in the population. Ignoring rare cases like greenbeards, r is primarily due to 
genealogical relatedness (so r approximates 0.5 for full siblings, 0.25 for aunts/uncles, and so 
on). This focus on genealogical relatedness has earned Hamilton’s theory the name ‘kin 
selection’.  
Hamilton’s formulation presents a simple rule for when altruism can evolve. If c is the direct 
fitness cost to performing an action and b is the benefit to others (in terms of increased 
reproductive success), altruism can evolve when: br > c. This is known as Hamilton’s rule, 
and demonstrates how altruistic behaviors - such as sterile worker castes in eusocial insects - 
can evolve. As a simple example, imagine that individuals only interact with full siblings. 
Individuals with the altruistic gene increase their partner’s reproduction by 3 children at a 
cost of a decrease in their own reproduction by 1 child. Given these parameters, b=3, r=0.5 
and c=1. Therefore, as br > c (3 * 0.5 = 1.5, which is greater than 1), this behavior can 
evolve, even though it involves a cost to the focal individual’s direct fitness. This concept 
was pithily summarized by Haldane, who quipped that he would lay down his life for two 
brothers (r=0.5) or eight cousins (r=0.125). 
 
 
Formal definition of altruism 
From this Hamiltonian perspective, altruism is defined as a behavior which causes a decrease 
in an individual’s lifetime direct fitness, but increases the lifetime fitness of others. The 
lifetime direct fitness consequences to self are therefore negative, while the lifetime fitness 
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consequences to recipients are positive (-/+; where the first term is the direct fitness effect of 
the behaviour on the focal individual (c), and the second term is the indirect fitness effect of 
the behaviour on recipient’s fitness (b)). This is in contrast to mutually-beneficial behavior 
which has positive lifetime fitness consequences for both parties (+/+). Together, altruistic 
and mutually beneficial behavior can be grouped together as ‘cooperation’ (West et al., 
2007). Behavior can also be selfish, which means it increases an individual’s direct fitness at 
a fitness cost to others (+/-), or it may be spiteful, in which case behavior decreases both the 
direct fitness of the focal individual and the fitness of the recipient (-/-; table 1). 
Table 1: A classification of social behaviors based on their direct fitness effects on the 
focal individual (actor) and the fitness consequences for the recipient. 
 
Fitness effect on recipient (b) 
+ (positive) - (negative) 
Direct fitness effect 
on actor (c) 
+ (positive) Mutual benefit Selfishness 
- (negative) Altruism Spite 
 
Note that altruistic behavior does not necessarily require a decrease in personal fitness 
relative to selfish behavior if interactions are assortative, which occurs when altruists 
preferentially interact with each other (that is, r > 0). Rather, altruism is defined as a decrease 
in direct fitness, rather than a simple decrease in personal fitness (which is an individual’s 
total reproductive success, so includes help received from others; note that personal fitness is 
also known as ‘neighbor-modulated fitness’). When r=0 altruists will always have lower 
personal fitness than selfish types, but when r>0 altruists may have greater personal fitness 
than selfish types, given that altruists preferentially interact with and help one another. 
5 
 
Regardless of whether a personal fitness or inclusive fitness approach is adopted, for any 
value of r, altruists will have lower direct fitness than selfish types. As this is all rather 
abstract, the difference between personal fitness and inclusive fitness is presented in figure 1, 
while a worked example comparing the two approaches in a simple Prisoner’s Dilemma 
scenario, is presented in figure 2. The essential difference between the two is that inclusive 
fitness only considers an individual’s actions on their own fitness (direct fitness) plus the 
fitness benefit given to others (weighted by relatedness; indirect fitness), while personal 
fitness considers an individual’s actions on their own fitness (direct fitness) plus the fitness 
benefits received from others (indirect fitness). In the personal fitness formulation ‘r’ is 
conceptualized as the probability of correlated interactions between individuals with altruistic 
genes (rather than strict genetic relatedness), although in most species the main reason for 
correlated interactions is genetic relatedness (Birch & Okasha, 2015). Despite different 
conceptualizations regarding whether indirect fitness is classified as help given to others 
weighted by genetic relatedness (the inclusive fitness approach) or as help received from 
others and r as the probability of correlated interactions (the personal fitness approach), both 
approaches are (by and large) mathematically equivalent as they both predict that altruism 
can evolve when br > c (Birch & Okasha, 2015). For additional details of how to measure 




Figure 1: Calculating fitness from: A) the personal fitness approach (also known as 
‘neighbor-modulated fitness’), in which help (b) is received from others; and B) the inclusive 
fitness approach, in which help (b) is given to others, weighted by the coefficient of 




Figure 2: Worked example of how to calculate personal fitness and inclusive fitness given 
different values of r (the coefficient of relatedness). The population consists of four 
individuals, two of which are altruists (smiley faces with a halo) and two of which are selfish 
types (smiley faces with devil horns). Both strategies begin with a baseline level of fitness 
(wo), which has a value of 1. Altruists pay a cost (c) of 1 unit of fitness to help others (b), 
which increases their partner’s fitness by 3. The population is split into two groups (n=2). If 
groups form randomly (r=0), then groups will be composed of one altruist and one selfish 
type (left-hand column). While if groups form non-randomly, with altruists always interacting 
with other altruists (r=1), then groups will be composed of either solely altruists or solely 
7 
 
selfish types (right-hand column). The central row details how to calculate the personal 
fitness of altruists and selfish types for both r=0 and r=1, while the bottom row details how to 
calculate inclusive fitness. WPF(A) is the personal fitness of altruists, WPF(S) is the personal 
fitness of selfish types, WIF(A) is the inclusive fitness of altruists, while WIF(S) is the inclusive 
fitness of selfish types. Although both approaches calculate fitness differently, they both come 
to the same conclusion; that is, selfish types have higher fitness if groups are formed 
randomly, while altruists have higher fitness when groups are formed non-randomly (given 
specific values of r, b and c). 
 
Altruism in the real-world 
As recognized by Darwin, the behavior of non-reproductive eusocial insects seems to fit this 
definition of altruism, where individuals help their relatives reproduce, even though they 
engage in no direct reproduction. Cooperative breeding in vertebrates (such as meerkats, 
callitrichids, and several bird species) also follows a similar pattern as it often occurs between 
relatives, so non-reproductive individuals appear to gain indirect fitness benefits by helping 
their kin. Additionally, as predicted by Hamilton’s rule, in insects, birds and mammals, 
monogamy (and therefore high levels of sibling relatedness) precede the evolution of 
cooperative breeding (Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 2012).  
Despite the empirical and theoretical attention received by indirect benefits as explanations 
for such seemingly-altruistic behavior, in many cases other potential explanations based on 
direct fitness benefits may have been overlooked (Clutton-Brock, 2002). For instance, 
cooperation among kin is not necessarily evidence of altruism if both parties increase their 
direct fitness, as can occur with reciprocity between relatives. As another example, 
seemingly-altruistic sentinel behavior among meerkats may in fact be less costly than often 
assumed, as sentinels are not at an increased risk of predation (Clutton-Brock et al., 1999). 
Additionally, relatedness to the group does not predict sentinel activity, suggesting that 
indirect benefits to kin may not explain this behavior. Rather, the best-fed meerkats are more 
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likely to take up guard duty if a sentinel is not present already, suggesting that this behavior 
may be largely for selfish reasons to avoid predation.  
Furthermore, cooperative breeding in birds - where subordinates help dominants raise the 
brood - is again often claimed to be due to indirect fitness benefits, as the helpers are often 
siblings of the chicks. Although these indirect fitness benefits are likely to be important, 
subordinates may also gain direct fitness benefits by increasing the survival of both 
themselves and the nest, then subsequently inheriting the breeding rights of the nest after 
their parents. This appears to explain variation in helping behavior among birds, where the 
sex which is more likely to inherit the nest provides greater levels of help, despite equivalent 
levels of relatedness (Downing et al., 2018). 
In long-lived animals where all individuals can reproduce, it can be especially difficult to 
determine whether an organism is acting altruistically, cooperating for mutual benefit, or 
behaving for purely selfish reasons. Non-reproductive eusocial insects are a rather simplified 
example as all fitness has to be indirect since reproduction is impossible, but it is much 
harder to determine whether behavior is altruistic in humans and other animals, as most 
adults are capable of reproduction and lifetime fitness consequences are hard to measure. 
Thus, although altruism is easy to define, it may be hard to spot in practice (Grafen, 1984). 
 
Alternative definitions of altruism  
The discussion above can be thought of as the ‘first-order problem of altruism’, which 
explains the difficulties in altruistic behavior evolving. Next, we discuss the ‘second-order 
problem of altruism’ (or ‘the problem of the problem of altruism’), in which different authors 
use different definitions of ‘altruism’. This is especially common in the human literature, 
which is often by necessity cross-disciplinary, meaning that terms common to various 
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disciplines may have different meanings within each discipline. We discuss three common 
second-order problems of altruism which are frequently found in the literature. The first 
concerns different definitions of altruism from a multi-level selection approach, the second 
concerns altruism measured on different time-scales, while the third concerns conflating 
evolutionary and proximate definitions of altruism. Although we have presented a definition 
of altruism derived from inclusive fitness above (which was used as it is the most common 
definition employed in evolutionary biology; West et al., 2007), we are not advocating that 
this is the only or correct usage. Rather, we are advocating that whichever decisions authors 
make regarding the term ‘altruism’ they are clear on which definition they are using. 
 
Altruism and multi-level selection: 
While the definition above based on a kin selection framework is a common definition of 
altruism in evolutionary biology, it is not the only one that exists in the literature (West et al., 
2007). Proponents of a ‘multi-level selection’ (MLS) perspective on evolutionary change 
define altruism as a behavior which decreases individual fitness within groups but increases 
the fitness of the entire group (Sober & Wilson, 1998). The long-term evolutionary trajectory 
is then determined by the relative strengths of within-group selection (which acts against 
altruism, as selfish types have greater fitness than altruists within groups) and between-group 
selection (which favors the spread of altruism, as groups with more altruists have greater 
fitness than groups with fewer altruists). Note also that although kin selection and MLS 
approaches appear rather different, they are equivalent approaches mathematically (Birch & 
Okasha, 2015); they just partition fitness in different ways (kin selection into direct and 
indirect fitness effects; MLS into within- and between-group components). One view is 
therefore not necessarily more correct than the other: the difference between these 
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frameworks is in perspective, not process. While kin selection approaches define altruism in 
absolute terms over the entire population, from an MLS perspective altruism is defined 
relative to the group. As will be discussed below, this can lead to different expectations of 
when altruism can evolve, depending on whether one adopts an inclusive/personal fitness or 
MLS perspective.  
Within the MLS framework there are two flavors of altruism: weak and strong (Wilson, 
1990). Weak altruism occurs when altruists have lower fitness than selfish types within 
groups, but have greater fitness than if they were not altruistic. An example is riding a tandem 
bike: if one person pedals and the other does not, then the lazy rider exerts less energy than 
the individual who pedals (i.e., selfish types have greater fitness within groups), but the 
altruist has greater fitness than if they did not pedal at all, as at least if one person pedals they 
will reach their destination (Kerr & Godfrey-Smith, 2002). This scenario is presented 
abstractly in figure 3a. As the altruist increases their own fitness by cooperating, this behavior 
is not altruistic from a kin selection perspective, but rather may be mutually-beneficial to 
both parties, or simply self-interested, as the benefit derived by others is an incidental by-
product. As such, weak altruism does not require assortment, so this behavior can evolve in 
randomly-formed groups (i.e., if r=0). 
In contrast, strong altruism occurs when altruists possess both lower fitness than selfish types 
within groups and lower fitness than if they were not altruistic. The example presented in 
figure 2 of a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma is an example of strong altruism (see also figure 3b). 
If group formation is random, then altruists have lower fitness compared to if they did not 
cooperate. Thus, if a behavior is strongly altruistic from an MLS perspective, then it is also 





Figure 3: Strong and weak altruism, as defined from a multi-level selection perspective. The 
population consists of altruists (smiley faces with a halo) and selfish types (smiley faces with 
devil horns). A) ‘Weak’ multi-level altruism: Altruists have lower fitness than selfish types 
within groups (i.e., in a mixed group, selfish individuals have greater fitness than altruists). 
However, given the choice between being an altruist or being selfish, individuals have 
greater fitness if they decide to be an altruist (as the fitness of an altruist in a group of one 
altruist and one selfish type is greater than the fitness of a selfish type in a group of no 
altruists). B) ‘Strong’ multi-level altruism: As with weak multi-level altruism, altruists have 
lower fitness than defectors within groups. However, given the choice between being an 
altruist or being selfish, individuals have greater fitness if they decide to be selfish (as the 
fitness of an altruist in a group of one altruist and one selfish type is lower than the fitness of 
a selfish type in a group of no altruists). Weak altruism does not require assortative group 
formation in order to occur, while strong altruism does. 
 
One must therefore be careful when converting between altruism as defined from an MLS 
perspective (which often uses the multi-level Price equation, which partitions selection into 
between- and within-group components; Sober & Wilson, 1998) and altruism as defined from 
a kin selection perspective (which uses Hamilton’s rule of br > c). Under conditions of weak 
altruism, behavior may be altruistic from an MLS perspective, but not altruistic from a kin 
selection approach, as acting ‘altruistically’ increases an individual's direct fitness. Of course, 
which definition people use is subjective - and a plurality of approaches can help to 
understand problems in greater detail (Kerr & Godfrey-Smith, 2002). However, it can cause 
confusion if different definitions of ‘altruism’ are used synonymously (West et al., 2007).  
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Short-term altruism:  
Some authors define altruism in terms of short-term costs, rather than in terms of life-time 
direct fitness (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). For instance, in reciprocal altruism, 
individuals pay a short-term cost to cooperating, but it is not necessarily altruistic in the 
Hamiltonian sense defined above, as they increase their direct fitness in repeated cooperative 
interactions. That is, the behavior is mutually-beneficial (+/+), rather than altruistic (-/+; 
although note that reciprocity is weakly altruistic from an MLS perspective, as groups of 
reciprocators outcompete selfish groups, even though in mixed groups selfish types have 
greater fitness than reciprocators; Sober & Wilson, 1998). Several models of ‘altruistic 
punishment’ or ‘strong reciprocity’ also appear to share this feature, where altruism is defined 
in terms of short-term pay-offs, rather than in terms of lifetime direct fitness (e.g., Gintis, 
2000). These features, combined with a focus on between-group competition to spread such 
‘altruistic’ behavior, can make it difficult to determine whether the behavior in these models 
is altruistic from a kin selection perspective or not (Keller & Lehmann, 2006).  
 
Evolutionary and psychological altruism: 
Up until now, we have been dealing with why altruism might have evolved, and how it may 
be adaptive in a social environment. However, as with everything else in biology, the study of 
a behavioral trait concerns two distinct questions – why a behavior evolved, and how the 
behavior works, i.e., the ultimate and proximate explanations. It is crucial to maintain a 
separation between these explanations when attempting to understand and explain any trait. 
For instance, knowing that individuals feel reward when they punish defectors is a proximate 
answer for why humans punish, but it does not answer why the behavior evolved. An answer 
to this question would be an ultimate explanation in terms of individuals who detect and 
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punish free-riders have greater fitness than those who do not detect and punish free-riders. In 
the case of altruism, evolutionary explanations deal with fitness considerations of individuals 
and groups, while psychological explanations are largely based on the motives of the actor.  
We now look at altruism from a psychological perspective. Hamilton’s theory postulated that 
altruistic behavior can evolve due to the inclusive fitness benefits it bears for the actor via 
indirect reproduction in kin. For these benefits to play a mechanistic role in behavior 
however, they need to be experienced by the actor in the form of feelings, motivational 
factors, or moral factors (Monroe, 1994). Psychological altruism deals with the understanding 
of such motivations that can drive one to benefit others at a cost to self (although unless 
directed towards kin, such psychologically altruistic behavior is generally framed as being 
short-term altruistic, rather than evolutionarily altruistic). Empathy, for example, is an 
emotional mechanism that can propagate other-regarding behavior, by creating a feeling of 
connectedness (De Waal, 2008). By the psychological mechanisms of emotion contagion and 
perspective-taking, individuals can ‘put themselves in other’s shoes’ and act in the interests 
of others and against narrow short-term self-interest. Morality forms a cultural norm, as well 
as part of one’s conscience, that can promote such seemingly-altruistic behavior by dictating 
that one must help others, sometimes even at a cost to themselves. To the extent that these 
norms become internalized, other-regarding preferences - and therefore psychological 
altruism - can emerge. 
Though ultimate evolutionary explanations do not consider the internal motives of an actor to 
determine altruism - after all, eusocial insects are evolutionarily altruistic yet we would be 
unlikely to ascribe to them altruistic motives - the literature largely persists in using terms 
that are reflective of these motives. Actions are called “selfish” or “altruistic” based on 
whether the actor only seeks benefits for herself, or intends to benefit another. This 
oftentimes ensues confusion between evolutionary and psychological altruism, and leads to 
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conflation of terms. Since these terms also have high vernacular use – which are mostly to do 
with one’s motives – they can cause further confusion in the evolutionary understanding of 
altruism (Sober & Wilson 1998). Some authors use evidence of psychological altruism to 
claim that some human behavior is evolutionarily altruistic. For instance, Richerson and 
Boyd (2005, pages 216-221) review evidence for empathy and seemingly-altruistic 
cooperation in one-shot economic games with strangers (to be discussed below) and conclude 
that humans possess other-regarding preferences. They then use this evidence for 
psychological altruism to argue that evolutionary altruism towards non-kin may also exist. 
However, as a general rule there is no clear relationship between evolutionary and 
psychological definitions of altruism, and they should not be confused with one another, or 
used interchangeably. Behaviors that are psychologically altruistic, can be evolutionarily 
either selfish or altruistic, and vice versa.  
An example to demonstrate this is a man saving a drowning (unrelated) child. This behavior 
may decrease the man’s lifetime direct fitness (and increase the fitness of the child) and 
therefore be evolutionarily altruistic. Alternatively, although this behavior involves a short-
term cost, this behavior may increase his direct fitness if he is more likely to be chosen as a 
future reciprocal trading partner or as a mate, in which case this behavior is not evolutionarily 
altruistic. Similarly, the man’s intentions may be psychologically altruistic if he genuinely 
cares about the child’s welfare. However, his motives may not be altruistic if he perceives the 
scenario as a chance to enhance his reputation, rather than caring about the child. Thus, to 
classify an act as psychologically altruistic, the actor must intend to bring benefits to the 
recipients, even at a cost to themselves. But definitions of altruism based on intentions are 





Does psychological altruism exist? 
While determining an actor’s true intentions and motivations is a difficult task, many 
psychologists and economists often take a rather pessimistic view towards psychological 
altruism, in which altruistic acts are treated as a subtle variant of self-interest. For instance, 
altruistic acts have been explained from an egoistic perspective, in which actors help others 
solely in order to reap future benefits, for instance by forming reciprocal relationships. 
Alternatively, these acts have been explained from an egocentric perspective, in which actors 
behave altruistically if watching the pleasure of her beneficiaries exceeds the satisfaction of 
consuming the commodity itself (Khalil, 2004). According to both these views, no act is truly 
psychologically altruistic since the actor gets either reputational advantages, or feels pleasure 
and internal gratification from their seemingly-altruistic acts (altruistic hedonism). This 
pessimism has been well captured by Ghiselin (1974) in the following lines, ‘‘What passes 
for cooperation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and exploitation...Scratch an altruist, 
and watch a hypocrite bleed’’. Based on these motivations, economists sometimes partition 
altruism into pure and impure altruism; in pure altruism, the only motive of the actor is the 
outcome of the altruistic act itself (e.g., aid being given to children in need), whereas in 
impure altruism, the impact on the recipient’s welfare is not the primary motivator, as instead 
the actor gets a ‘warm-glow’ or feeling of goodness, which comprises a private benefit 
(Andreoni 1990). 
However, despite these difficulties of determining whether an act is psychologically altruistic 
or not, some experiments have indicated that certain aspects of human behavior are indeed 
motivated by a concern for others’ welfare. This optimistic view was endorsed by Adam 
Smith (1759) who wrote that, 
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“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to 
him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”  
The empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson et al, 1987) claims that empathy evokes motivation 
to reduce the other’s need, promoting altruism, and that self-benefits from such acts are 
simply unintended consequences of the ultimate goal (helping the other). In a series of 
experiments conducted by Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner and Clark (1981), there were various 
degrees of emotional responses in reaction to seeing someone in need. Piliavin and colleagues 
quantitatively described a low magnitude emotional response to other’s needs in non-
emergency situations as empathy, such as feeling sympathetic, compassionate or tender, and 
a high magnitude emotional response to other’s needs in emergency situations as personal 
distress, such as feeling alarmed, upset or disturbed. These emotional and psychological 
responses to other’s needs are hypothesized to provide the motivation for other-regarding 
behavior in humans (Batson et al, 1987). These and other experiments suggest that humans, 
at least in part, are motivated by a concern for the welfare of others, indicating that 
psychological altruism may indeed exist. 
 
Case study of human altruism: Behavior in economic games 
Numerous experiments have demonstrated that humans behave seemingly-altruistically in 
experimental economic games, where the optimal strategy is to free-ride on the cooperation 
of others: in all societies tested, humans frequently cooperate with strangers, contribute to 
public pools, punish selfish individuals at a personal cost in one-shot interactions, and even 
punish those who defect on others (so-called third-party punishment; Henrich et al., 2005; 
Bernhard et al., 2006). This behavior appears both evolutionarily altruistic - as individuals 
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help others at a cost to self, despite a lack of repeated interactions or reputational effects - and 
psychologically altruistic - as individuals appear motivated to assist others and enhance their 
welfare.  
However, leaving aside the question of whether behavior in these games is psychologically 
altruistic, the assumption that such behavior is detrimental to fitness, and therefore 
evolutionarily altruistic, has been questioned on several fronts. First, although this behavior is 
seemingly-altruistic in the context of the game (and is certainly short-term altruistic), the 
strategies adopted by players in these games may be mutually-beneficial when applied 
outside the lab in real-world settings. The costs of mistaking repeated interactions for a one-
shot interaction may be high, in which case seemingly irrational cooperation in one-shot 
encounters may evolve (Delton et al., 2011). Second, the design of these experimental games 
is likely to be unfamiliar to most participants, which mean that individuals tend to use 
behavioral strategies from outside the lab (which are likely to be more cooperative than the 
optimal behavior in these games) when first playing these games. Supporting this 
interpretation are findings that individuals with greater experience in these games are less 
cooperative than ‘naive’ participants, presumably because they have learned that it pays not 
to cooperate in these situations (Rand et al., 2014). Third, it is very difficult to know exactly 
what behavior in these games means in terms of real-world cooperation, as the external 
validity of behavior in these games is often low (Gurven & Winking, 2008); although 
substantial levels of cooperation towards strangers are observed in these experiments, in the 
real-world unsolicited cooperation towards strangers is much rarer (Winking & Mizer, 2013). 
Of course, perhaps behavior in these games (and some behavior in the real-world) are 
examples of evolutionary altruism, but it is very difficult to know definitively, and these 
alternative interpretations cast doubt on the conclusion that some cooperative behavior in 




The concept of altruism has a fraught intellectual history, with numerous varying and 
conflicting definitions in use. With the term ‘altruism’ being used across disciplines, like 
evolutionary biology, economics, psychology and philosophy, it is impossible to classify 
altruism by a single agreed-upon definition. This plurality of approaches means that authors - 
especially those engaging in cross-disciplinary work - need to clearly define what they mean 
by ‘altruism’, in order to forestall misunderstandings and unnecessary confusion. This is 
especially pertinent for the distinction between evolutionary and psychological altruism. In 
this chapter we have attempted to describe various definitions of altruism found in the 
literature, including Hamiltonian altruism, multi-level selection altruism (both weak and 
strong), short-term altruism, and psychological altruism, as well as the links - or lack thereof, 
in the case of evolutionary and psychological altruism - between these definitions. Given this 
multitude of definitions, it is no wonder that, despite being a topic of interest for centuries, 
we still do not have an established understanding and consensus on ‘what is altruism’ and 
whether much human behavior is in fact altruistic (both from evolutionary and psychological 
perspectives). Clarifying one’s own meaning of altruism can go a long way to solve this 
second-order problem of altruism, and allow coherent interaction between disciplines in order 









Altruism among Nonkin; Reciprocal Altruism and Cooperation for Mutual Benefit; 
Reputation and Altruism; Psychology of Reciprocal Altruism; Altruism Norms; Evolution of 
Reciprocal Altruism; Kin Selection Hypothesis; C<Rb; Cooperation varies with Genetic 
Relatedness; Hamilton’s Rule; Hamilton’s Rule and Theoretical Implications; Hamilton’s 
Rule and Kin Investment; Altruistic Punishment and Strong Reciprocity; High-Cost Altruistic 
Helping; Group Selection; Multilevel Selection Theory. 
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